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“Properly formulated, we perceive the question before us to be whether the 
federal government can issue a mandate that Americans purchase and maintain 
health insurance from a private company for the entirety of their lives.”   Florida v. 
HHS, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3519178 at *44 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).  “[W]hat 
Congress cannot do under the Commerce Clause is mandate that individuals enter 
into contracts with private insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive 
product from the time they are born until the time they die.”  Id.at *66.   
So wrote the Eleventh Circuit in declaring the Individual Mandate (26 
U.S.C. §5000) to be facially unconstitutional.  The Sixth Circuit upheld this 
Mandate against a facial challenge but allowed for the possibility it would be found 
unconstitutional in an  “as applied” challenge.  This case presents that “as applied” 
challenge to the Individual Mandate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder have standing to challenge the 
Individual Mandate. 
A. Hill has standing to challenge the Individual Mandate because 
this law forces her to buy a product she does not want. 
The Sixth Circuit noted, “[t]here are two potential theories of injury—
‘actual’ present injury and ‘imminent’ future injury … ”  by which standing may 
be established.  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, __ F.3d __, (6th Cir. 2011) 
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2011 WL 2556039 at *3, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992).  “Injury in fact” is established by showing violation of a legally protected 
interest is actual or imminent.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Davis v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (“[T]he injury required for standing need not 
be actualized.  A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the 
threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.”).  When the plaintiff is the object 
of the challenged law, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction 
has caused him injury.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62.   
In Thomas More, the Sixth Circuit noted: 
In view of the probability, indeed virtual certainty, that 
the minimum coverage provision will apply to the 
plaintiffs on January 1, 2014, no function of standing law 
is advanced by requiring plaintiffs to wait until six 
months or one year before the effective date to file this 
lawsuit.  
 
Thomas More at *5. 
[T]he plaintiffs need not do anything to become subject 
to the Act. That, indeed, is their key theory—that mere 
“existence” should not be a basis for requiring someone 
to buy health insurance on the private market. Plaintiffs 
have standing to bring this claim. 
Id. at *6. 
Hill alleged, and affirmed in her affidavit, the Individual Mandate applies to 
her and that she does not want to comply with it.  Pls’ Br. at 16-29.  This Court has 
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“entertained constitutional challenges where the statute clearly applies to the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff has stated a desire not to comply with its mandate.”  
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 987 (8th Cir. 2009).     
Hill plead that she is “[an] ‘applicable individual,’ subject to the Individual 
Mandate provision of PPACA, which provides that if I fail to meet the individual 
mandate requirement for more than a month, a penalty is imposed that must be 
included in my tax return.” (JA 195, ¶8, see also JA 43-45). 
Hill declared, “I do not want to purchase any health insurance policy 
mandated by the PPACA.”  (JA 196, ¶14).  The Individual Mandate “mandates that 
I purchase a certain health insurance policy which includes coverage I do not want 
to purchase.”  (JA 197, ¶16).  Hill also stated, “I wish to exercise my legally 
protected right … to not purchase the health insurance policy mandated by [the 
Individual Mandate] … ”  (JA 197, ¶17).  And, everyone acknowledges the 
Individual Mandate applies to Hill. 
The government recognizes Hill’s “plans for future financial obligations by 
forgoing spending today,” Govt’s Br. at 23.  These and Hill’s many other specific 
statements in her complaint and affidavit surpass the “relatively modest”1 standard 
establishing standing her to challenge a law. 
                                                 
1  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1997). 
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“[G]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 
conduct” are sufficient to establish standing at the pleading stage because ‘we 
presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to 
support [a contested] claim.’”  Constitution Party of South Dakota v. Nelson, 639 
F.3d 417, 420-21 (8th Cir. 2011), quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.   
Hill is not required to say she will “forgo a five-year contract on a new car” 
or “forgo college savings” to establish her standing to challenge this law.  See 
Govt’s Br. at 22, n.2.  Hill’s statements that she plans for the future by “foregoing 
certain spending today so the necessary funds will be available in the future,” and 
that she must know whether she will be assessed the penalty, satisfy the “relatively 
modest” burden to show “actual” injury from the Individual Mandate. 
B. Hill also has standing because the Mandate infringes her rights 
under the Missouri Freedom Act. 
The government claims, “Hill’s invocation of the ‘Missouri Health Care 
Freedom Act’ … adds nothing to her standing argument.”  Govt’s Br. at 25, n.4.  
The government’s dismissive treatment of the Missouri Freedom Act is amazing. 
The Freedom Act was passed by an overwhelming consensus of Missouri 
voters – Republican and Democrat.  Pls’ Br. at 32; (JA 432).  This law guarantees 
Hill and other Missourians the right to be free from being forced to buy medical 
insurance.   
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When a federal law intrudes upon an area of state sovereignty, individual 
liberty interests can be infringed. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 
2355 (2011).  Far from “add[ing] nothing to her standing argument,” the Individual 
Mandate directly infringes Hill’s rights under The Freedom Act.   
C. Peter Kinder also established standing to challenge the Individual 
Mandate. 
Standing of only one plaintiff is needed to establish jurisdiction.  Thus, since 
Hill has standing to challenge the Individual Mandate, this Court has jurisdiction.  
Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 2006); Florida at *3 (“The law is 
abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each 
claim—as is the case here—we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs 
have standing.”).   
But, Kinder also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Individual Mandate. 
The government claims Kinder “cannot show that the minimum coverage 
provision is having a ‘direct and immediate’ impact on his conduct.”  Govt’s Br. at 
26.  The government is wrong.  A “direct and immediate impact” is not the 
standard.  See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170; Constitution Party of South Dakota, 639 
F.3d at 420-21.   
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The enforcement of the Mandate is certain to occur in 2014.  The very first 
allegation is that “Peter D. Kinder is a Missouri citizen …”  (JA 84, ¶1).  As a 
Missouri citizen, Kinder is subject to the Individual Mandate and its penalties, 
which infringe on his rights to be free from being forced to purchase a federally 
mandated health insurance policy.  (JA 102, 113, 116, 118, 121, 135-36). 
Kinder affirms he is an “applicable person” subject to the Individual 
Mandate.  (JA 187, ¶13).  While currently eligible for the state employee health 
plan, Kinder’s eligibility depends on his position as lieutenant governor.  This 
eligibility does not extend beyond his current term in office which ends in January 
2013 - one year before Kinder is subject to the Individual Mandate’s penalty 
provisions.  (JA 187, ¶¶15-16).  See also Thomas More at *5 (“The plaintiffs claim 
a constitutional right to be free of the minimum coverage provision, and the only 
thing saving them from it at this point is two and a half more years …”). 
Kinder need only show a realistic danger the Individual Mandate and its 
penalties would apply to him, which he has done.  Kinder thus has standing.   
The district court was therefore wrong to deny Hill and Kinder the right to 
challenge the Individual Mandate. 
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D. New Jersey Physicians does not cure the ills of the government’s 
standing argument. 
The government seeks succor from New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President 
of the United States, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 3366340 (3rd Cir. Aug. 3, 2011).  
Govt’s Br. at 25.  In New Jersey Physicians:  
The only allegations pertaining to any injury in fact 
suffered by [plaintiff] are as follows: (1) “Roe is a patient 
. . . who pay[s] himself for his care,” and (2) Roe “is a 
citizen of the State of New Jersey who chooses who and 
how to pay for the medical care he receives . . . .”  
 
New Jersey Physicians at *4.   
That was the sum total of the “Roe” plaintiff's allegations. 
Samantha Hill’s allegations are nothing like the “Roe” plaintiff in New 
Jersey Physicians.  Hill explained in more than two dozen separate allegations (1) 
why she is subject to the Individual Mandate, (2) why she does not want to comply 
with it, (3) how she will be assessed a penalty for her non-compliance with it, and 
(4) how its imposition on her infringes on her constitutionally protected rights.  (JA 
87-88; 117-18; 120-21; 136).   These allegations are further supported by her 
detailed, sworn statements in her affidavit.  (JA 194-98).  What more could Hill 
have said to establish the point that (a) the Individual Mandate applies to her and 
(b) she does not want to comply with this mandate? 
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It is not Hill’s burden to disprove a negative, e.g., that some unforeseen, 
speculative happenstance could prevent the Individual Mandate from being 
enforced against her. 
II. Assuming Kinder and Hill have standing, the government does not 
disagree that this Court should determine whether the Individual 
Mandate is constitutional. 
This Court should address the merits of this constitutional challenge even 
though the trial court wrongly dismissed the case on standing and did not reach the 
merits.  The government does not dispute this point. 
This Court has proceeded to resolve cases on the merits when the issues 
were “well-developed” and “amenable to review,” U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Rapid 
Robert’s, Inc., 130 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1997), and where the parties had 
addressed the legal issues.  Pfoutz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 527, 
530 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988).   
In this case, the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate has been 
prodigiously briefed by both sides and by the one hundred forty-one amici, which 
include twenty-one states, qua states, in support of the Plaintiffs, eleven states in 
support of the government, more than one hundred and fifty elected officials from 
states subject to this Court's jurisdiction, and numerous interest groups. 
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Remand would only delay an inevitable return to this Court.  Any lower 
court decision on remand would be given no deference on a purely legal issue 
because questions on the constitutionality of federal statutes are reviewed de novo.  
United States v. McMasters, 90 F.3d 1394, 1397 (8th Cir. 1996). 
A delay incident to an unnecessary remand would impose a considerable 
hardship on the parties and also a hardship on citizens and governments of those 
states subject to this Court’s jurisdiction.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Executive and 
Legislative Officials Of States Within the Eighth Circuit in Support of Appellants, 
filed July 18, 2011, pp. 12-22 (asking this Court to resolve this constitutional 
challenge on its merits). 
III. The Individual Mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
We turn now to the heart of this case. 
Our Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§8, cl. 3.  This clause grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce.”  It does not 
grant Congress power to compel otherwise passive individuals to enter commerce 
and buy a product 
The Individual Mandate represents an unprecedented – and unconstitutional 
- intrusion of the federal government into the lives of American citizens and it lies 
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beyond the broadest reach of that power granted Congress under the Commerce 
Clause.   
“The government has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.”  Florida at *45, citing CBO 
Memorandum, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance, at 1 (Aug. 1994).  See also Thomas More at *26. 
If the Individual Mandate is sustained - as the government argues - Congress 
has limitless power to force citizens to do or buy anything on the pretext that not 
doing or buying that “thing” affects interstate commerce.  As the Eleventh Circuit 
recognized, the Individual Mandate is premised upon a view of the Commerce 
Clause that lacks any coherent limiting principle.  Florida at *66-67.   
If this Court accepts the government’s argument, the federal government 
will no longer be the limited government of enumerated powers conceived of by 
our Founding Fathers.  The constitutional “first principle” that those powers 
granted the federal government are “few and defined,” while those remaining in 
the states are numerous and indefinite, would, for all practical purposes, cease to 
exist.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995), citing The Federalist No. 
45, pp. 292-93; see also U.S. CONST., amend X (“The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.”).   
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Our Constitution withholds from Congress “a plenary police power that 
would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.  
(See also JA 436-440).  Under the government’s view, the Commerce Clause is 
effectively converted into a general police power.  See Amicus Brief of Missouri 
Attorney General in Florida.  (JA 436-440). 
A. The Individual Mandate exceeds the outer limits of the Commerce 
Clause established in modern jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court has never held the Commerce Clause granted Congress 
power to force someone to enter commerce and purchase a specific federally 
designated product. 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), did not involve a law forcing a 
farmer to grow wheat; it involved a law regulating how much wheat a farmer grew.  
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), did not involve a law compelling someone 
to grow marijuana; it involved a law prohibiting those already growing marijuana 
from doing so.  In Lopez, the Court held the Commerce Clause did not grant 
Congress power to prohibit someone from carrying a gun at school.  514 U.S. 549.  
In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court held the Commerce 
Clause did not grant Congress authority to grant victims of gender-motivated 
violence a civil remedy because doing so exceeded Congress’s power because 
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“[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.” 
In all these cases, there was a common denominator – a certain activity was 
the subject of the challenged law.  There is no case which has ever held Congress 
has the power under the guise of the Commerce Clause to compel an individual 
who does not desire to participate in commerce to do so or be punished.2 See, 
generally, Brief of Amici Curiae Texas and Twenty Other States in Support of 
Appellants, filed July 18, 2011, pp. 3-18.  
                                                 
2  Judge Sutton in Thomas More sidesteps this important point by redefining 
the Individual Mandate.  In Judge Sutton’s view, the Individual Mandate is a 
regulation of those who pay for their health care through self-insurance.  This re-
styling of the Individual Mandate is why Judge Sutton upheld the provision.  But, 
he erred because, by its own terms, that is not what §5000 does.  Judge Sutton 
wrongly reframed the Individual Mandate as regulation of “self-insurance” by 
those already consuming health care.  It is not.  That is simply not how the law is 
written. 
 The mandate and penalty apply monthly. As the government acknowledges, 
the Individual Mandate "amends the Internal Revenue code to provide that a non-
exempted individual who fails to maintain a minimum level of coverage shall pay a 
monthly penalty for so long as he fails to maintain that minimum coverage.”  
Govt’s Br. at 38 (emphasis supplied).  Judge Sutton's presupposition that the 
Individual Mandate applies to those actively participating in the health care market 
is not correct.  As written, the Individual Mandate applies monthly to Hill and 
Kinder regardless of whether they are receiving health care or not, i.e., irrespective 
of whether they are “participants in the health care market.”   
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The government never explains how “not having insurance” is any different 
than “not having a GM Volt” or “not having a house” or “not having a gun.”  See 
Florida at *44. 
The government contends Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 
222 (1938), held “[t]he Supreme Court has long rejected the contention that the 
commerce power cannot be exercised until after the harm to commerce takes 
place.”  Govt’s Br. at 39.   
Frankly, so what?  This misses the point.  In every Commerce Clause case, 
the Supreme Court has always focused on an activity as a predicate for Congress to 
exercise its regulatory authority.  Never has the Supreme Court held Congress can 
compel an activity on the pretext that the absence of that activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce.   
Consolidated Edison involved “reasonable preventive measures” to block 
unfair labor practices interfering with the right to form and join labor unions.  
Before upholding the law, the Supreme Court detailed the activities of the 
regulated utilities, including supplying electricity to railroads, ports, piers, 
telegraph and telephone companies, radio companies, an air field, and federal 
government operations.  305 U.S. at 220-21.  “It cannot be doubted that these 
activities, while conducted within the State, are matters of federal concern.”  Id. at 
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221.  Consolidated Edison, a large national utility company selling electricity, was 
clearly and obviously engaged in an interstate activity – selling electricity. 
The desire of Samantha Hill and Peter Kinder to not buy a federally-
mandated insurance policy bears no resemblance to Consolidated Edison selling 
electricity.  See Florida at *50 n.100 (describing why Consolidated Edison is 
“wholly inapposite”).     
The government’s reference to a federal law requiring motor carriers 
operating in interstate transportation to have insurance further illustrates how the 
government misperceives this issue.  See Govt’s Br. at 40 (referencing 49 U.S.C. 
§13906(a)). 
The law the government cites regulates trucking companies already 
operating trucks in interstate commerce.  This law is regulation of the 
“instrumentalities” in interstate commerce (i.e., trucks).  It is not the third category 
of activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.  The truck insurance 
law is, thus, inapposite to the Individual Mandate which is premised upon an 
extension of the “substantially affects interstate commerce” doctrine. 
Unlike the interstate truck insurance law, the Eleventh Circuit considered the 
more analogous National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 as an apt illustration of how 
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Congress has traditionally (and constitutionally) sought to encourage commercial 
activity it favors.  Florida at *46. 
Congress recognized the substantial cost of flood-related losses.  But, 
Congress did not require everyone with a house in a flood plain to buy flood 
insurance.  Instead, Congress created incentives to encourage voluntary purchase 
of flood insurance.  “[D]espite the unpredictability of flooding, the inevitability 
that floods will strike flood plains, and the cost shifting inherent in uninsured 
property owners seeking disaster relief funds, Congress has never taken the 
obvious and expedient step of invoking the power the government now argues it 
has and forcing all property owners in flood plains to purchase insurance.”  Id.   
This contrast with the Flood Insurance Program demonstrates how the 
Individual Mandate compelling commercial activity is truly unprecedented.  In 
passing this law, the 111th Congress has gone where no Congress has gone before, 
compelling otherwise inactive individuals to enter commerce and buy a federally 
mandated product. 
B. Congressional “findings” do not cure the Individual Mandate’s 
constitutional infirmities. 
The government claims that because Congress said it was regulating activity 
that substantially affected interstate commerce, it must be so.  Govt’s Br. at 28-30.   
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The Supreme Court in Morrison anticipated this argument and warned us 
that Congress might try to use the Commerce Clause to “completely obliterate the 
Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority.”  529 U.S. at 615.   
[T]he existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of 
Commerce Clause legislation. As we stated in Lopez,  
“‘[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a 
particular activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’” [citations] 
Rather, “‘[w]hether particular operations affect interstate 
commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional 
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a 
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be 
settled finally only by this Court.’” 
 
    Id. at 614 (internal citations omitted). 
The Individual Mandate is even less viable than the law in Morrison.  Here, 
Congress is trying to regulate the absence of activity based solely on that non-
activity’s supposed effect on interstate commerce.  If regulating non-economic 
activity undermined the constitutionality of legislation in Lopez and Morrison, 
regulating non-activity would as well. 
The government’s “cost-shifting” argument does not change the analysis.  
Govt’s Br. at 29.  The Supreme Court has already rejected “cost-shifting” 
arguments made to defend laws that exceed Commerce Clause power.  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 563-64; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.   
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“The wholesale deference the government would have us apply here cannot 
be squared with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrison and Lopez. . . . It is 
highly instructive that the Lopez and Morrison Courts rejected a similar cost-
shifting theory now propounded by the government.”  Florida at *56. 
The government’s timing and cost-shifting would apply equally to a law 
requiring every person to buy a coffin – or pre-paid funeral policy – simply 
because we will all one day die.  Such a requirement would not pass constitutional 
muster, and neither does the Individual Mandate. 
Similarly, Congress’s “goals” are irrelevant to the constitutionality of the 
Individual Mandate. 
“Plaintiffs support the laudable goal of assuring that every Missourian—and 
American—enjoy access to quality health care.  Plaintiffs bring this case, however, 
because it is necessary that legislation seeking this objective be consistent with 
their rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions.”  (JA 83). 
It simply does not matter what Congress hoped to accomplish if it did so in 
violation of its constitutional authority.  The Supreme Court explained how even 
lofty motives can be “insidious.” 
The good sought in unconstitutional legislation is an 
insidious feature, because it leads citizens and legislators 
of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the 
serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or 
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the harm which will come from breaking down 
recognized standards.  
 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922). See also Florida at *67, 
citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992), for the proposition 
“‘[n]o matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply 
does not give Congress the authority’ to supersede its constitutionally imposed 
boundaries.”  (internal citations omitted). 
The Eleventh Circuit explained how, in making this argument, the 
government skipped “important analytical steps.”  Florida at *55.  In particular, 
courts must “examine whether the link between the regulated activity and interstate 
commerce is too attenuated, lest there be no discernible stopping point to 
Congress’s commerce power.”  Id. 
To hold this law – which forces Hill and Kinder to buy a specific insurance 
policy – as constitutional would eliminate any “discernible stopping point to 
Congress’s commerce power” and would be a de facto recognition of a general 
federal police power.  Florida at *55. 
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C. An unconstitutional act of Congress, like the Individual Mandate, 
is made no less unconstitutional by embedding it in a “larger 
regulatory scheme” or claiming it was adopted because there is a 
“crisis.” 
The government seems to believe that by attaching the label “crisis” to 
legislation, Congress can act beyond its constitutional limits.  The government uses 
the word “crisis” throughout its brief to describe the “health care market.”3  For 
example, “[i]n responding to the crisis in the health care market, Congress 
confronted a market different from any other.”  Govt’s Br. at 3 (emphasis 
supplied). 
The government then contends the Individual Mandate is constitutional 
because it is “integral to broader economic regulation” adopted to meet this 
"crisis."  Govt’s Br. at 32.  The government claims by imbedding the Individual 
Mandate in a “larger regulatory scheme” Congress made it constitutional.   
The Eleventh Circuit considered the government’s “larger regulatory 
scheme” argument at length and found it flawed: 
[T]he mere placement of a particular regulation in a 
broader regulatory scheme does not, ipso facto, somehow 
render that regulation essential to that scheme.  It would 
be nonsensical to suggest that, in announcing its ‘larger 
                                                 
3  The current Administration has also declared all of the following (and more) 
situations to be a “crisis:” “swine flu crisis,” “housing crisis,” “banking crisis,” 
“global warming crisis,” “Gulf oil-spill crisis,” “jobs crisis,” and, most recently, 
the “Hurricane Irene crisis.” 
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regulatory scheme’ doctrine, the Supreme Court gave 
Congress carte blanche to enact unconstitutional 
regulations so long as such enactments were part of a 
broader, comprehensive regulatory scheme.  …  Such a 
reading would eviscerate the Constitution’s enumeration  
of powers and vest Congress with a general police 
power.” 
 
Florida at *64. 
The government’s discussion of state laws on emergency care (Govt’s Br. at 
42, n.6) only highlights how the Individual Mandate violates the fundamental 
principles of federalism.  Traditionally, states have regulated health insurance 
pursuant to their police power.  How states exercise their police power does 
nothing to change the fact that Congress does not have a general police power.  See 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (“[T]he Constitution cannot realistically be 
interpreted as granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.”); 
id. at 618-19, citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring) (The 
Supreme Court has “always []  rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the 
scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.”) 
(emphasis in original).  
The government wrongly tries to shift to Hill and Kinder a burden to 
“identify a preferable regulatory alternative . . . .”  Govt’s Br. at 43.  It is not 
Plaintiffs’ responsibility to help Congress reform the nation’s health care as a 
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precondition to challenging an unconstitutional law.  Rather, it is Congress’s 
responsibility to act within its constitutionally limited authority when it writes 
legislation.   
D. The Necessary & Proper Clause is not an independent grant of 
power to Congress and it does not make the otherwise 
unconstitutional Individual Mandate constitutional. 
Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote, “Let the end be legitimate, let it 
be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316, 421 (1819).   
The “end” Congress sought with the Individual Mandate was to force Hill 
and Kinder to buy a specific – and expensive – insurance policy from a private 
company.  So, is this end “legitimate”?  Is this end “within the scope of the 
Constitution”?  We think not.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Texas and Twenty Other 
States, filed July 18, 2011, pp. 20-25 ("The lack of any limiting principle on this 
power and the reality that it amounts to a federal police power vitiates any reliance 
on the Necessary and Proper Clause." (Id. at p. 25)). 
The “means” by which Congress sought to accomplish this “end” is the 
provision of the Individual Mandate that imposes a significant financial penalty on 
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Hill and Kinder for every month in which they have not purchased a federally 
mandated insurance policy.  So, we ask, is this penalty imposed on Hill and Kinder 
“not prohibited” by the Constitution, and is this penalty consistent “with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution”?  Again, we think not.  It is prohibited because it is 
an unconstitutional exaction (See Plf’s Br. at 64-67).  And, it is contrary to the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.  It is inconceivable the Founding Fathers 
assembled in Constitution Hall believed the Constitution they drafted granted 
Congress authority to force individuals to purchase a federally defined insurance 
policy. 
The government seeks support from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Raich to argue Congress has “every power” to make certain regulations effective.  
Govt’s Br. at 33.  But the government conveniently omits the preceding sentences 
which reveal that activities are required: 
Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the 
Court nevertheless recognized that it could be regulated 
as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 
514 U. S., at 561. This statement referred to those cases 
permitting the regulation of intrastate activities “which 
in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise 
of the granted power.”   
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545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  There thus must still be 
some activity which is “regulated.”   
The most recent interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause was in 
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010).  The government 
made only passing reference to this case, failed to address any of the relevant 
factors, and did not dispute Plaintiffs’ discussion of why Comstock undermines any 
justification of the Individual Mandate under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Compare Govt’s Br. at 27, 39, 42 with Pls’ Br. at 61-63.   
In particular, the government does not rebut that the majority of the 
Comstock factors – particularly the Mandate’s excessively broad scope, its conflict 
with state interests, and a lack of long-standing federal regulation in insurance –
undermine any justification of the Individual Mandate.4   Pls’ Br. at 61-63.  In 
short, Comstock provides the court no basis to uphold the Individual Mandate 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
                                                 
4 The government makes much of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. 533 (1944).  In this case, the subject of the regulation was “interstate 
[fire] insurance companies” that conducted activities “back and forth across state 
lines.”  Id. at 545.  The Court explained why these companies could be regulated, 
noting the extensive communications, payments, and “continuous and indivisible 
stream of intercourse” among the states.  Id. at 541-42. 
 The government cannot honestly claim a case upholding regulation of multi-
state insurance companies transacting business “back and forth across state lines” 
is precedent to support the federal government forcing unwilling individual state 
residents to enter commerce and buy a product they do not want.    
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The government’s recourse to United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (8th 
Cir. 2009), does not support its argument.  Govt’s Br. at 46.  In Howell, “Congress 
was focused on the interstate movement of sex offenders, not the intrastate activity 
of sex offenders.”  552 F.3d at 716.  This Court also noted how “Congress limited 
the enforcement of the registration requirement to only those sex offenders who 
were either convicted of a federal sex offense or who move in interstate 
commerce.”  Id.  “Instead of creating a federal crime for failure to register 
regardless of interstate movement, Congress understood its limited interstate 
commerce power and reserved prosecution of wholly intrastate offenders to the 
states.”  Id. 
E. The government reads Judge Sutton’s concurrence too broadly.  
The government claims Plaintiffs must show that under “no set of 
circumstances” would the Individual Mandate be valid.  Govt’s Br. at 47-48.  The 
government is wrong.   
This case is a challenge to the Individual Mandate “as it applies” to Hill and 
Kinder.  The challenge in Thomas More and Florida was a facial challenge.  While 
the Eleventh Circuit declared the Individual Mandate to be facially 
unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Individual Mandate.  But, as Judge 
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Sutton noted, the Sixth Circuit expressly left open the possibility the Individual 
Mandate would be unconstitutional “as applied.” 
The nature of this challenge – a pre-enforcement facial 
attack on the individual mandate in all of its settings, as 
opposed to just some of them – favors the government.  
In most constitutional cases, the claimant challenges the 
constitutionality of a statute “as applied” to specific 
parties and circumstances.  That is ‘the preferred route…’ 
* * * 
[N]othing about this view of the case precludes 
individuals from bringing as-applied challenges to the 
mandate as the relevant agencies implement it, and as the 
“lessons taught by the particular,” prove (or disprove) 
that congress crossed a constitutional line in imposing 
this unprecedented requirement.  Just as courts should 
refrain from needlessly pre-judging the invalidity of a 
law’s many applications, they should refrain from doing 
the same with respect to their validity. 
 
Thomas More at *23, 33 (emphasis in original). 
 
This case is such an “as applied” challenge.  And, as applied to Kinder and 
Hill, the Individual Mandate is unconstitutional. 
F. The “health care is different” argument has no constitutional 
significance. 
The government claims “health care is different.”  But, this “health care is 
different” argument lacks any constitutional significance.  The government wants 
this Court to carve out a separate constitutional standard governing legislation 
concerning “health care.”  Our Constitution provides no basis upon which to 
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 31      Date Filed: 09/01/2011 Entry ID: 3824870
  
- 26 - 
LDR/343525.1 
 
premise such a separate constitutional standard because health care is “different.”  
As the Eleventh Circuit noted: 
Even in the face of a Great Depression, a World War, a 
Cold War, recessions, oil shocks, inflation, and 
unemployment, Congress never sought to require the 
purchase of wheat or war bonds, force a higher savings 
rate or greater consumption of American goods, or 
require every American to purchase a more fuel efficient 
vehicle.   
 
Florida at *46.   
The Constitution speaks of post offices, post roads, and military forces.  But, 
there is no mention of health care.  If the drafters had shared the government’s 
present sentiment that “health care is different,” such a provision could have been 
included in the Constitution (or could have been added by subsequent amendment).  
It was not.   
The lack of historical precedent for the Individual Mandate highlights its 
constitutional defects.  Florida at *46-47, citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 905, 907-08 (1997) (“[T]he utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the 
States’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), 
suggests an assumed absence of such power.”) (emphasis in original); see also Va. 
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) 
(“Lack of historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity.”).  And, “[I]f 
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... earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have 
reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. 
The government cannot exceed its constitutional authority to “regulate 
commerce” and compel Hill and Kinder to enter commerce and buy a product 
simply because “health care is different.”  The only thing “different” about the 
Individual Mandate is Congress’s attempt to force unwilling individuals to be 
conscripted health insurance consumers.   
Finally, the government insults the motives of those challenging the 
Individual Mandate: “[S]tripped of rhetorical excess, the practical right that 
plaintiffs seek to vindicate is the ability to consume health care services without 
insurance and to pass costs on to other market participants.”  Govt’s Br. at 50.  
This demeaning quip presupposes Hill and Kinder seek to pass costs of their health 
care to others.  Not so.  Rather, Kinder and Hill do not want Congress to force 
them to buy an insurance policy for services they will never use.  To wit: 
substance-abuse treatment and other such services. 
IV. The Individual Mandate is not a “tax,” and if it were, it would be an 
unconstitutional un-apportioned direct tax. 
No court has accepted the government’s tax-power argument.  The Eleventh 
Circuit found all federal courts considering the government’s taxing power 
argument have ruled against it “with clarion uniformity.”  Florida at *68.  “[A]ll 
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have found, without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory 
penalty, not a tax.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
So far, both appellate panels to have considered the constitutionality of the 
Individual Mandate soundly rejected the government’s taxing power argument.  
The Eleventh Circuit held: 
The plain language of the statute and well-settled 
principles of statutory construction overwhelmingly 
establish that the individual mandate is not a tax, but 
rather a penalty. . . .The government would have us 
ignore all of this and instead hold that any provision 
found in the Internal Revenue Code that will produce 
revenue may be characterized as a tax. This we are 
unwilling to do.   
 
Florida at *69.  See also id., at *83 n.1 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
The Sixth Circuit identically held: 
At the end of the day, this penalty is not a “Tax[ ]” under 
Article I of the Constitution, and Congress’s taxing 
power thus cannot sustain it. 
Thomas More at *21.  See also id. *34 (Graham, J., concurring in part) (“I concur 
with … Judge Sutton’s opinion that the challenged statute is not an exercise of 
Congress’s taxing power.”).5  
                                                 
5 The third judge declined to address the issue.  Id. at *16 (Martin, J.) (declining to 
address “whether the provision could also be sustained as a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power to tax and spend . . . .”).   
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The penalties imposed on those who violate the Individual Mandate are 
decidedly not a “tax.”  See Pls’ Br. at 66.  Even if the penalties imposed on Kinder 
and Hill could be considered a “tax” (which they cannot), they are unconstitutional 
as an un-apportioned direct tax.  See Pls’ Br. at 64-65. 
In sum, the “shared responsibility penalties” are just that: penalties.  They 
are not a “tax.”  The government’s argument that the Individual Mandate is a “tax” 
is without merit. 
V. The Individual Mandate violates the right Missouri citizens enjoy under 
The Freedom Act. 
Kinder and Hill are Missouri citizens.  Under Missouri law they enjoy the 
right to decide – free from governmental coercion – whether or not to buy medical 
insurance and what medical insurance to buy.  The Freedom Act was passed 
overwhelmingly by Missouri voters and provides “[n]o law or rule shall compel, 
directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to participate 
in any health care system.”  R.S.Mo. §1.330 (2010); Pls’ Br. at 29-33; 67-68.    
As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “it is undisputed that the Individual Mandate 
supersedes a multitude of states’ policy choices in these areas of traditional state 
concern.”  Florida at *61.  Missouri citizens acted consistent with this when they 
adopted The Freedom Act.  But, the government is tone deaf to this central 
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principle of federalism and disregards the state-federal balance enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
The Supremacy Clause does not apply because the presumption is that 
historic police powers of the States are not superseded by a federal act unless that 
is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.  Id. at 67, citing Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Moreover, the Supremacy Clause is 
construed narrowly in light of the presumption against pre-emption of state police 
power regulations.  Id., citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 
(1992).   
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this point in Bond.  “The individual, 
in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the 
authority that federalism defines.  Her rights in this regard do not belong to a 
State.”  131 S.Ct. at 2363-64.  “An individual has a direct interest in objecting to 
laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and 
the States  when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, 
particular, and redressable.  Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States 
alone to vindicate.”  Id.  “Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within 
a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power 
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cannot direct or control their actions.”  Id. at 2364.  “When government acts in 
excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.”  Id. 
The Individual Mandate infringes on precisely this fundamental principle of 
state-federal balance enshrined in the Constitution.  The requirement that these 
Missouri citizens buy a federally defined health-insurance policy violates their 
right under The Freedom Act to be free from such governmental intrusion into 
their personal health care decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress could have constitutionally addressed a perceived “crisis” in health 
care.  However, the means by which Congress chose to address this "crisis" 
exceeded its constitutional authority.   
When Congress exceeds its constitutional authority – as it did by imposing 
the Individual Mandate on Kinder and Hill - it is rightly the role of this Court to 
overturn such a law. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court’s decision on 
standing (finding that Hill and Kinder to whom the Individual Mandate applies 
have standing to challenge the law) and proceed to hold that, under the clear text of 
our Constitution and the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
Individual Mandate is unconstitutional. 
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